WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON THE COURTS IN THE
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The new South African Democracy (the New Democracy),
which established following the fall of the apartheid regime, made an
unequivocal commitment to gender equality and women’s rights,
thanks, in part, to the efforts and advocacy of South African women.
The fulfillment of this commitment required a transformation of
government and society that would reach and penetrate every
institution of the New Democracy. The judiciary, though not exclusive
in bearing this transformative obligation, was intended to be an
important agent of change. The New Democracy, however, inherited a
judiciary that had no legitimacy ― a problem that required the
complete transformation of the judiciary by race and gender.
Unfortunately, the record on this score, more than a decade after the
inauguration of the New Democracy, has been woeful. This paper
explores the reasons why women are so underrepresented in the courts
of South Africa, as well as possible solutions to the problem.

I. GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY
South Africa’s first inclusive election, held in 1994, replaced
the apartheid regime with a constitutional democracy based on social
justice and fundamental human rights. These fundamental human
rights, as expressed in the South African Constitution (the
Constitution), included a prominent and unequivocal commitment to
gender equality and women’s rights ― they were to be, as Cathi
Albertyn expressed it, “a moral touchstone” of the New Democracy.1
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In his first State of the Nation address to Parliament, Nelson Mandela
also spoke to the importance of gender equality and women’s rights,
stating that:
[f]reedom cannot be achieved unless women have been
emancipated from all forms of oppression. All of us
must take this on, that the objectives of the
Reconstruction and Development Programme will not
have been realized unless we see in visible and practical
terms that the condition of women in our country has
radically changed for the better, and that they have been
empowered to intervene in all aspects of life as equals
with any other member of society.2
Evidence of the importance of gender equality and women’s
rights abounds in the Constitution, the supreme law of the Republic.3
The language of the Constitution, except where specifically assuring
the inclusion of women, is non-sexist. Provisions relevant to gender
equality and women’s rights appear in the very first section of the very
first chapter, which lists human dignity and non-sexism among other
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1. C. Albertyn et al., Univ. of Witwatersrand, Engendering The Political Agenda in
South Africa, in ENGENDERING THE POLITICAL AGENDA: THE ROLE OF THE STATE, WOMEN’S
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 162, 162 (U.N. ed., 2000).
2. Id. at 162-63, (quoting First State of the Nation Address to Parliament (May 24,
1994)).
3. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 1, §2.
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founding values.4 The Bill of Rights, the second chapter of the
Constitution, prohibits both state and private discriminatory action and
covers indirect as well as direct discrimination, an acknowledgment
that unwritten, institutionalized sexism restricts women’s equality.5
The Bill of Rights also restricts freedom of expression when such
expression advocates hate based on gender and incites to cause harm.6
The Bill of Rights prohibits the state from discriminating
unfairly on seventeen specified grounds that include gender, sex,
pregnancy, marital status, sexual orientation and birth.7 Other
provisions of particular importance to women include: the right “to be
free from all forms of violence from . . . private sources,” which
protects against domestic violence; the right “to make decisions
regarding reproduction”; the right “to security and control over” one’s
body; and, given the reality that poverty is a women’s issue, socioeconomic rights, such as access to adequate housing, health care,
sufficient food and water and social security.8 The Constitution
charges the state with the promotion and fulfillment of those rights that
are significant to women, even when those rights conflict with
customary and religious law, which are important in South Africa and
often restrictive of women’s rights.9
In addition to these enumerated rights, the Bill of Rights also
incorporates rights embodied in international instruments and even
foreign laws.10 The Constitution thereby extends to women the rights
contained in instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women11 and the Vienna
Declaration on Violence Against Women.12
To promote these envisioned rights, the Constitution
establishes independent institutions, including the Commission for
Gender Equality and the South African Human Rights Commission.13
4. Id. at ch. 1, § 1 (a), (b).
5. Id. at ch. 2, § 9 (3).
6. Id. at ch. 2, § 16 (2) (c).
7. Id. at ch. 2, § 9 (3-4).
8. Id. at §§ 26 (1), 27 (1).
9. Id. at §§ 7 (2), 31 (a), (b).
10. Id. at § 39 (1) (b), (c) (stating that courts "must consider international law; and may
consider foreign law").
11. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/180 (1979).
12. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
13. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 9, § 181(1).
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The Constitution charges the former with promoting “respect for
gender equality and the protection, development and attainment of
gender equality.”14 It charges the latter with promoting “respect for
human rights and a culture of human rights” and “the protection,
development and attainment of human rights.”15
In part, the Constitution’s treatment of gender equality and
women’s rights resulted from the efforts of women in the African
National Congress (ANC).16 They mobilized in 1989, after which they
met in and out of South Africa.17 Their meeting at the beginning of
1990 in Amsterdam, about a month before the unbanning of the ANC,
produced a statement that the struggle for gender equality should be an
“autonomous aspect of the national liberation” effort.18 This meeting
also produced a Programme of Action that called for “building a
national women’s movement within the context of a non-racial, nonsexist democratic South Africa.”19 The efforts of the ANC’s Women’s
League also gave impetus to a women’s rights movement that
subsequently led to the formation of a broadly based Women’s
National Coalition, which by 1994 included ninety-two national
organizations and thirteen regional organizations.20
Although only a few women participated in the negotiation
process that produced the Constitution, those women were nonetheless
indefatigable in pressing the women’s agenda, with the aid of the
Coalition and its members.21 Albertyn, in emphasizing the importance
of these women’s efforts, noted that by the end of the negotiation
process, “women had consolidated a powerful victory ― the location
of gender equality on the political agenda as an enduring principle of
the [New Democracy] . . . .”22
14. Id. at § 187(1).
15. Id. at § 184(1) (a), (b).
16. See, e.g., C. Albertyn, Women and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa,
1994 ACTA JURIDICA 39.
17. See, e.g., id. at 47-49.
18. Id. at 48.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 50-51.
21. Id. at 54-57.
22. Albertyn, supra note 1, at 170. Of course, the contributions of women did not stop at
the constitutional negotiations. Having worked hard to get gender equality and women’s
rights into the Constitution, feminists knew that what they had won would not be selfimplementing. A group of feminist lawyers therefore wanted to use the courts to breath life
into women’s rights. As soon as the constitutional negotiations were under way, they
developed a proposal and sought funding to establish an organization that would be dedicated
to using litigation on behalf of women’s constitutional rights. They persisted in their
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COURTS TO THE TRANSFORMATION AND
THE ADVENT OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The goals of the New Democracy required a transformation of
government and society that would reach and penetrate every
institution. The judiciary, though not exclusive in bearing this
transformative obligation, was intended to be an important agent of
change.23
Under apartheid, the judicial system was subordinate to
parliament and bound to uphold executive and legislative actions
regardless of their egregious human rights violations. Under the new
Constitution, however, the judicial system became an independent
institution “subject only to the Constitution and the law,” which it was
mandated to apply “impartially and without fear, favor or prejudice.”24
The Constitution gave the judiciary important powers, including the
power of judicial review.25 The Constitutional Court is thus the final
arbiter of constitutional matters ― it confirms or rejects lower court
decisions and is empowered to determine whether Acts of Parliament
and the conduct of the President are consistent with the Constitution.26
The decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on all persons
and on all courts.27 The Constitution further orders “organs of state” to
“assist and protect the courts” in order to “ensure the independence,
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.”28
Significantly, the rights embodied in the Constitution are
justiciable rights. This makes clear the courts’ importance in fulfilling
the Constitution’s promises to women, especially given the familiarly
of South Africans with “cause lawyering”― that is, the use of courts
to advance human rights causes. South African law schools had taught
determination and, after almost five years, succeeded in establishing the Women’s Legal
Centre, which would prove to be a valuable advocate for women’s rights in the New
Democracy. See generally, R.B. Cowan, The Women's Legal Centre During its First Five
Years, 2005 ACTA JURIDICA 273.
23. With the passage of time, moreover, the judiciary took on an even greater
importance as the implementation of women’s rights by Parliament and administrative
agencies slowed to a frustrating pace. See generally C. Albertyn, Defending and Securing
Rights through Law: Feminism, Law and the Courts in South Africa, 2005 POLITIKON 217.
24. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch.8, §165 (2).
25. Id. at ch. 8.
26. Id. at ch.8, § 167.
27. South African Government Information, http://www.info.gov.za.aboutgovt/justice
/courts.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
28. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 8, §165 (4).
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courses on cause lawyering and the Legal Resources Centre ― cofounded by Arthur Chaskalson, who was to serve as Chief Justice of
South Africa and head of the new Constitutional Court ― had trained
a generation of lawyers in using the courts in the cause of human
rights.

III. THE CHALLENGES OF THE INHERITED JUDICIARY: APARTHEID’S
LEGACY OF JUDICIAL ILLEGITIMACY
The popular perception of the judiciary that the New
Democracy inherited from the apartheid regime challenged the New
Democracy’s intended use of the judicial system as an agent of
transformation. The judiciary, in the eyes of many South Africans,
simply had no legitimacy. Arthur Chaskalson spoke of this problem in
the following statement:
In 1994 when the interim Constitution came into force,
and in 1996 when the elected Constitutional Assembly
adopted our present Constitution, we were one of the
most unequal societies in the world. The past hung over
us, profoundly affecting the environment. The great
majority of the people . . . had been the victims of a
system of racial discrimination and repression which
had affected them deeply . . . in almost all aspects of
their lives.29
Under apartheid, the courts were an often-used and reliable
enforcer of repression. In other words, they were “positivist
functionaries.”30 Deputy Judge President Jeannette Traverso, the
second woman ever appointed to the bench, described the court’s role
by noting that, under apartheid, judicial officers “merely applied the
law without any concern for basic principles of justice and human
rights.”31 Edwin Cameron, judge of the Transvaal High Court, in his
29. A. Chaskalson, Address at the Opening of the Judges' Conference (July 16, 2003), in
120 S. AFR. L.J. 652, 659 (2003).
30. Morne Olivier, The Role of Judicial Officers in Transforming South Africa, 118
S.AFR. L.J. 455, 457 (2001).
31. J. Traverso, Transformation of the Judiciary: Changing the Racial and Gender
Composition, Presentation at Roundtable Discussion Hosted by the Inst. for Democracy and
the Univ. of Cape Town's Democratic Governance and Rights Unit 11 (Oct. 11-12, 2005),
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submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, elaborated on
this with the following statement:
[D]uring apartheid, the judiciary incontestably played a
role in the enforcement of a pernicious system. But its
very special role must be adequately understood. The
distinguishing feature of apartheid . . . was that it was
defined and enforced through an elaborate and
sophisticated legal system. At the apex of that system
were the judges. . . . [A]partheid was . . . sustained and
distinguished by legal regulation and by enforcement
through a highly sophisticated legal system. The
complicity of all judges who held office under apartheid
is therefore incontestable. . . . [The legal system]
accentuated the crudity and barbarity of the purposes
apartheid sought to achieve.32
The apartheid judiciary had thus brought the “administration of
justice into disrepute.”33 Blacks, consisting of Africans, Coloreds and
Indians, constituted more than ninety percent of the population. Under
apartheid, they had been the targets of apartheid’s repression and
depravity. The majority of South Africans, therefore, did not respect
the judiciary because of its enforcement of apartheid laws. 34
The judiciary’s negative reputation, moreover, survived beyond
the fall of the apartheid system. One partial explanation for this is that
“when provided the opportunity to redeem itself during the [Truth and
Reconciliation Commission] Legal Hearings, the judiciary, under
‘new’ leadership, abstained from participating in the proceedings.”35 In
addition, the demographics of the judiciary also reinforced its negative
transcript available at http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles.asp? WriteContent=
Y&RID=1432.
32. Edwin Cameron, Submission on the Role of the Judiciary under Apartheid, 115 S.
AFR. L.J. 436, 436-37 (1998) (memorandum sent to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Sept. 23, 1997).
33. Norman Arendse & Vuyani Ngalwaria, The Underrepresentation of Blacks and
Women at the Bar, CONSULTAS, May 1998, at 74.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. MELANIE LUE-DUGMORE, SOUTH AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL
MODELS AND MECHANISMS RESPONSIBLE FOR: THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND POLICING,
THE PROMOTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT; AND A REVIEW OF TRANSFORMATION
STRATEGIES AND INITIATIVES DEVELOPED IN RELATION TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
AND
SAFETY AND SECURITY
23
(2003),
available
at
http://www.police
accountability.co.za/File_Uploads/docs/File_Download.asp?This File=cajpap.pdf.
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reputation. In 1994, for instance, one hundred and sixty-one of the one
hundred and sixty-six superior court judges were white males. There
were only two women judges, one of whom the apartheid government
had appointed as it departed.36 The almost all white, all male apartheid
judges were, by agreement, to remain in their positions, and many of
these judges maintained, as one report documented, “the values and
attitudes that aided and abetted a system of injustice.”37
In addition to the issue of illegitimacy, the judicial system that
the New Democracy inherited faced functional problems as well. The
inherited superior court system consisted of High Courts and the
Supreme Court of Appeal, consisting “of 11 establishments, each with
separate and disparate administrations, systems and distribution of
resources.”38 The court buildings were in disrepair, some without such
basic equipment as “desks, chairs and telephones.”39 In rural areas,
some court buildings were without electricity or water.40 In addition,
the New Democracy also had to deal with the fact that many South
Africans had relied on traditional courts and “community dispute
resolution structures,” rather than “the state’s ‘western’ courts” during
the apartheid years.41 These systems relied on customary law that often
conflicted with “with constitutional protections such as equality and
due process.”42 These challenges, however, were arguably ancillary to
the judiciary system’s perceived illegitimacy, which represented its
most salient defect.

36. Debating the Transformation of the Judiciary: Rhetoric and Substance,
EPOLITICSSA (Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr.), May 13, 2005, at 2.
37. LUE-DUGMORE, supra note 35, at 16. Similar problems

plagued the lower courts,
which handle approximately ninety-five percent of the court cases in South Africa. Id. at 25.
Prior to 1993, magistrate judges were civil servants in the executive branch, who were
“appointed by the Minister of Justice, and mainly from the ranks of the public service.” Id. at
25, 26. This changed in 1993, with the creation of the Magistrates Commission, “a statutory
control body for magistrates.” Id. at 26. Even after the fall of the apartheid regime, however,
the Commission remained a “conservative, exclusively white body that deliberated in
Afrikaans.” Id. Only after 1998, was the Commission “reconstituted to make it more
representative of South African society.” Id.
38. Id. at 11. The High Courts and Supreme Court of Appeal were previously named the
Supreme Courts and the Appellate Division, respectively.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 18.
42. Id.
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IV. IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUDICIARY BY RACE
AND GENDER
The perceived illegitimacy of the inherited judicial system
required the complete transformation of the judiciary by race and
gender. This meant eliminating all manifestations of the courts’
historic racism and sexism, a change mandated by the Constitution and
considered essential by many prominent South Africans. In the words
of the Honorable L. Mptia, Deputy President of the Supreme Court of
Appeal, “measures [were needed] to improve the image of the courts
and . . . ultimately make them acceptable to the majority who had for
decades viewed them as illegitimate.” 43
What measures were needed to accomplish this goal? The
Department of Justice, early in the life of the new government,
prepared a strategic plan of action, Justice Vision 2000, based on
extensive consultations with “a range of role players from civil
society” during 1994 and 1995.44 The plan suggested training
programs for sitting judges and for “aspirant judges” (i.e., those who
would be interested in serving as judges), transformation of the
professional legal organizations from which judicial appointees are
drawn, and changes in legal education.45 The plan also called for
greater representation on the bench of blacks and women. It thus
recognized that the judiciary could not consist of ninety-seven percent
white male judges and expect legitimacy. Justice, in other words, had
to be seen to be believed.
The Constitution reflects this understanding. It stresses the
“need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender
composition of South Africa” and then mandates that this need “be
considered when judicial officers are appointed.”46
The Constitution also provides a new, open, broadly
representative system for appointing judges to the superior courts.47
43. Honorable L. Mpati, Transformation of the Judiciary - A Constitutional Imperative,
Inaugural Lecture, Univ. of the Free State 22 (Oct. 6, 2004), transcript available at
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/sca/speeches/mpati.pdf.
44. LUE-DUGMORE, supra note 35, at 12. The new Minister of Justice, in 1999, further
refined this plan, producing a streamlined 10 Point Millennium Plan. Id.
45. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE VISION 2000: DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR THE TRANSFORMATION AND RATIONALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1996),
available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/1996/justice.htm#top.
46. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 174 (2).
47. Id. at §§ 174, 178.
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Under apartheid, the judicial appointment “system” involved a behindclosed-door process that included the President and the Minister of
Justice. It was this process, violative of the New Democracy’s values
of transparency and accountability, which produced the almost all
white Afrikaner, almost all male judiciary.
As a replacement for apartheid’s closed process, the
Constitution established the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).48 The
JSC is chaired by the Chief Justice of South Africa who also heads the
Constitutional Court. Its members include: the President of the
Supreme Court of Appeal; a Judge President of a High Court selected
by his Judge President peers (the masculine pronoun is accurate since
the Judge Presidents are all male); when there are matters before the
JSC regarding a specific High Court, the Judge President of that court
and the Premier of that province; the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development or her/his designee; presidential
appointees; members of Parliament’s National Assembly, some of
whom must be from the Assembly’s opposition parties; members of
Parliament’s National Council of Provinces, who must have the
support of at least six of the provinces; practicing advocates nominated
by their peers; practicing attorneys nominated by their peers; and a
university law professor selected by her/his peers.49
Every office and institution involved in the judicial
appointment process ― the President, the Chief Justice, the Minister
of Justice and Constitutional Development, members of the JSC, the
Judge Presidents and Deputy Judge Presidents who constitute the
courts’ leadership, and leaders of the organizations representing the
legal profession — have more than once asserted the necessity for
increased representation of blacks and women in the courts. The JSC
gave this necessity prominence in its first annual report, calling on
“[t]he Commission [to pay] particular attention to this requirement
when it considers applications for judicial appointment.”50 Carmel
Rickard, the legal editor for the Sunday Times has recognized ― and
lauded ― the importance given to diversity in the JSC’s guidelines for
questioning candidates:
Diversity . . . is a quality without which the Court is
unlikely to be able to do justice to all the citizens of the
48. Id. at § 178.
49. Id. at § 178 (1) (a - k).
50. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1994).
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country. . . . [I]t is a component of competence. The
court will not be competent to do justice unless, as a
collegial whole, it can relate fully to the experience of
all who seek its protection.51
Many, if not all, of those who have considered the topic
endorse the necessity of appointing more blacks and women. The JSC
devoted its entire meeting in October 1999 to the transformation of the
judiciary, as did the Heads of Court in April 2005. Numerous
conferences, formal discussions and symposia have addressed the
importance of the transformation of the judiciary by race and gender.
Pius Langa, for instance, the current Chief Justice of South Africa, has
recognized the significance of a judiciary characterized by “a white
unwelcoming face with black victims at the receiving end of unjust
laws administered by courts alien and generally hostile to them.”52 In
apartheid’s all-white judiciary, the Chief Justice declared,
[t]he language of the courts was not that of the
majority. Nor was the culture and social practices of the
judicial officers that of the racial majority. The white
face of justice was not only overwhelming and part of
an oppressive discriminating system; it also failed to
recognize the humanity of the victims of the apartheid
system.53
Advocate Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza realized that such concerns
applied not only to race, but also to gender. He recognized that an
almost all-white judiciary could not:
pretend that it [could], with legitimacy, deliver justice
to a majority black population. No judicial system that
holds sacrosanct values of equality between the sexes is
going to remain white and black male without having
51. Carmel Rickard, The South African Judicial Service Commission 5 (Univ. of
Cambridge, Document No. 879, 2003) (from the conference "Judicial Reform: Function,
Appointment and Structure," held by the Centre for Public Law on Oct. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view_doc_info.php?doc=879.
52. Mpati, supra note 43, at 21 (quoting Justice P. Langa, Judging in a Democracy: The
Challenge of Change, Address in Johannesburg, Mar. 20, 2004).
53. Id. at 21-22 (quoting Justice P. Langa, Judging in a Democracy: The Challenge of
Change, Address in Johannesburg, Mar. 20, 2004).
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white and black women sufficiently swelling the ranks
of the judiciary.54

Transformation was justified, according to Ntsebeza, because
blacks and women would “hand down judgments which [would] be
respected by the society they serve.”55 Others have expanded on this.56
Sir Sydney Kentridge, for example, in a 2004 lecture, argued that:
a generally more diverse bench with a wider range of
backgrounds, experience and perspectives on life, might
well be expected to bring about some collective change
in empathy and understanding for the diverse
backgrounds, experience and perspectives of those
whose cases come before them. 57
Of course, these justifications are ultimately superfluous.58 The
South Africa Constitution condenses all such arguments in its
unequivocal call for broader racial and gender representation. In South
Africa, in other words, the only justification needed is the one
provided by the country’s highest authority ― the Constitution. The
Constitution, however, could not affect this transformation on its own.
As Judge C.J. Howie, the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal,
observed, “[t]he advent of the liberating and empowering provisions of
the Constitution did not act, as might have been expected like the flick
of an attitudinal switch . . . .”59

54. Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Why Majority Black Bench is Inevitable, SUNDAY TIMES,
25 July 2004, as reprinted in Mpati, supra note 43, at 23.
55. Id. at 25.
56. See MTK Moerane, The Meaning of Transformation of the Judiciary in the New
South African Context, Address given at National Judges’ Symposium (July 16, 2003), in 120
S. AFR. L.J. 708, 712 (2003).
57. Sir Sydney Kentridge, The Highest Court: Selecting the Judges, Sir David Williams
Lecture at Cambridge (May 10, 2002), in 62 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 55 (2003) (quoting Lady Justice
Hale, 2001 P.L. 489, 501).
58. Chief Justice Pius Langa, in a conversation regarding the representation of women
in the judiciary, dismissed these justifications as “given.” Conversation with Chief Justice Pius
Langa, in Johannesburg (Dec. 8, 2005).
59. Judge C.J. Howie, The Judiciary in a Changing Terrain, Remarks at the IDASA
Conference 2 (Oct. 11, 2005), transcript available at http://www.idasa.org.za/gb
OutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID=1429.
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V. THE RECORD
Just as there is agreement about the necessity for women
judges, there is agreement that the record, more than a decade after the
inauguration of the New Democracy, is woeful. Chief Justice Arthur
Chaskalson, in his retirement speech at the end of May 2005, observed
this, noting that:
[c]lose to 50% of the judiciary are now black, but only
about 15% are women. . . . [W]e still have a long way
to go to free the potential of black and women aspirant
judges and to achieve the transformation that the
Constitution demands.60
In 2004, only twenty-eight (13.3%) of the 210 judges in the
superior courts of South Africa ― the twenty-four High Courts, the
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court ― were
women.61 Among the Heads of Court, there was no female Judge
President and there was only one Deputy Judge President.62 In the
Constitutional Court, as of May 2005, only two of the eleven justices
were women63 (a third has since been appointed) and on the Supreme
Court of Appeal, only two of the twenty judicial officers were
women.64 There were no women in four of the thirteen regional High
Courts and four additional courts had but one woman.65
The experiences of many of those few women judges,
moreover, reflect badly on the commitment of the male judges to nonsexism. One of the women in one of the one-woman courts serves
amidst fifty-four male judges,66 more than a few of whom resent her
60. Arthur Chaskalson, Farewell Speech (June 2, 2005), transcript available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/farewell.
61. Brigitte Mabandla, Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, Address at
the International Association of Women Judges' Conference (Aug. 7, 2004), transcript
available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04082016151005.htm. Numbers coming
from the same source (i.e., the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development) differ.
This accounts for the discrepancy between the 13.3 percent of women judges cited by Minister
Mabandla and the fifteen percent cited by CJ Chaskalson.
62. Id. Mabandla notes that the Lower Courts only have 467 women out of 1,779
magistrates. Id.
63. Chaskalson, supra note 60.
64. Debating the Transformation of the Judiciary: Rhetoric and Substance, supra note
36, at 4.
65. Id.
66. HORTORS LEGAL DIARY 176 (2006).
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presence. Another woman judge recalled her non-collegial treatment
by her fellow male judges in the following statement:
Normally, among judges who will hear a case together,
you talk beforehand about issues you will want to raise
when the matter is argued in court. In the first few years
they would not talk to me and even once we were in
court, on the Bench, I would sit there like a spare
wheel.67
Others recount experience of near non-existence in the eyes of
her fellow male judges. During her interview before the JSC, one
female candidate commented that after her appointment as an acting
judge, she felt as through she were “wearing a cloak that made her
invisible to her male colleagues”68 Women South African judges
reiterate these experiences in private conversations. It is their
observation that many ― too many ― male judges and lawyers in the
courts believe that women just do not belong.69
More than a decade after apartheid and despite the
constitutional commitment to transforming the judiciary, men continue
to constitute a large majority of the judges. A paucity of appointment
opportunities, moreover, has not impeded the appointment of women.
More than a dozen vacancies occur twice a year.70 In the year ending
in June 2004, for example, there were seventeen vacancies ― two in
the Constitutional Court, one in the Supreme Court of Appeal and
fourteen in the High Courts.71 Only four women, however, were
appointed.72

67. Carmel Rickard, Women Judges Tell of Struggle for Acceptance, SUNDAY TIMES (S.
Afr.), Apr. 10, 2005, http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=1423125
(emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Conversations with female judicial candidates at three-day annual meeting of the
South African Chapter of the International Association of Women Judges (Aug 2006).
70. Rickard, supra note 51, at 5.
71. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 4 (2004), available at
http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/reports/judicial_ar_2004.pdf [hereinafter 2004 JSC
ANNUAL REPORT].
72. Id.
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VI. OBSTACLES TO WOMEN’S APPOINTMENT TO THE SUPERIOR COURTS
Women graduate from South Africa law schools in significant
numbers. In many of the country’s nineteen law schools, they
constitute a majority of their class and shine as the best students. Why
then are women so underrepresented in the courts of a country that
mandates affirmative action in making appointments?
A. Continuing Patriarchy and Sexism
One reason women are underrepresented is the persistence of
patriarchy and sexism. Patriarchy and its resultant gender
discrimination relegated women to motherhood and confined them to
the home under male dominance. Women were thus discouraged from
the legal profession, which was neither an extension of motherhood
nor of home.73 An often-quoted decision by Judge Solomon, and
Melius de Villeurs’ subsequent comment about that decision, illustrate
this attitude. Judge Solomon concluded that women should not be
admitted to the practice of law because of “the immemorial practice of
centuries” emanating from the law of nature ― a higher law than the
law of men.74 De Villeurs, once Chief Justice of the Orange Free
State, later defended that decision. Writing in The South African Law
Journal, he argued that:
[a] revolt against nature is involved in any proposal to
allow women to enter into the legal profession . . . .
Their entrance into the profession is incompatible with
the idea and duties of Motherhood. . . . At a certain
period of life women cease to be capable of exercising
the functions of Motherhood; when that time comes the
chief objection to their becoming practicing lawyers
falls away. Whether at that period of time a woman
would care to start a legal practice seems
questionable.75

73. See Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray, Law and Women’s Rights in South Africa:
An Overview, 1994 ACTA JURIDICA 1, 17, 28 (discussing patriarchy in South Africa and
underrepresentation of women in professional occupations).
74. Incorporated Law Society v Wookey 1912 A.D. 623 (S. Afr.).
75. Melius De Villiers, Women and the Legal Profession, 35 S. AFR. L.J. 289, 290-91
(1918).
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According to R.P.B. Davis, who was to become an acting appellate
judge, “[t]he law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the
bearing and nurture of the children.”76 This is “a radical and sacred
duty,” and were women to practice law they would be violating this
duty, departing from “the order of nature; and when voluntary,
treason[ing] against it.”77 These views, embedded in conventional
wisdom, were also incorporated into legislation, as well as into
common law and authoritative commentary.
Other countries, of course, are familiar with such patriarchy
and sexism, but in South Africa customary and religious law also
embodies patriarchy and sexism. These laws apply to African and
Muslim women ― the overwhelming majority of the female
population ― and further obstruct the advancement of women.
Traditional and religious law comprehensively subordinates women to
male authority by consigning women to the home and establishing
motherhood as their primary role. Thandabantu Nhlapo, a South
African authority on customary law, summarized this in the following
statement:
What is it about custom that is inimical to women’s
rights? It is everything that emanates from an attitude to
women in marriage and in the family which sees them
solely as adjuncts to the group, means to the
anachronistic end of clan survival, rather than as
valuable in themselves.78
The challenge to these views does not have a long history in
South Africa. Albertyn, writing in 1994, noted that:
[i]t has only been in the immediate past, with the onset
of the transition and the breaking down of the racial
divisions of apartheid, that equality for all women has
been identified as an autonomous aspect of the
achievement of democracy79

76. R.P.B. Davis, Women as Advocates and Attorneys, 31 S. AFR. L.J. 383, 384 (1914).
77. Id.
78. T.R. Nhlapo, The African Family and Women’s Rights: Friends or Foes?, 1991
ACTA JURIDICA 135, 138–39.
79. Albertyn, supra note 16, at 42–43.
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Given that the women’s lobby only recently emerged around the time
of the constitutional negotiations, their success in establishing nonsexism as a foundational value and in incorporating the extensive list
of women’s rights represents an enormous achievement.80 But, this
important success did not carry with it either the promise or the
expectation that habits long entrenched in custom and law would
quickly change. The assumptions, attitudes and beliefs embedded in
patriarchy persist, and illustrations of this abound.
Primogeniture prevailed, for example, until 2004, when the
Women’s Legal Centre won a decision in the Constitutional Court,
which found primogeniture unconstitutional.81 Discrimination against
women married under Muslim rites prevailed until that same year
when the Women’s Legal Centre again won a favorable decision in the
Constitutional Court ― this time entitling widows married under
Muslim rites to the same maintenance benefits accorded widows
married under common law.82 An African woman magistrate, in a
conversation with the visiting Judicial Law Delegation in 2003, related
that she needed the permission of her father-in law, who was a tribal
leader, before she could accept a judicial appointment and — as the
appointment required ― use the family surname and wear nontraditional clothes.83
A more recent example of the lingering patriarchic attitude
toward women is provided by the rape trial of former Deputy President
Jacob Zuma. His supporters gathered in front of the court house as the
court considered the case. One day, as a woman entered the court
house ― a woman that Zuma’s supporters mistook for the complainant
― his supporters hurled stones at her. On another day, as the Mail &
Guardian reported, his supporters shouted words of abuse.84 Their
behavior provoked the bishops of the Methodist Church to express
their “disgust” and call on the police “to bring order and charge people

80. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
81. Bhe & Others v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha, & Others 2004 (2) SA 544 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
82. Daniels v Campbell NO & Others 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) (S. Afr.).
83. Interview with anonymous magistrate, in South Africa (Mar. 2003) (the name of the
magistrate and the exact location of the interview has not been listed at the request of the
magistrate, who wishes to remain anonymous).
84. Bishops’ Disgust at Conduct at Zuma Trial, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (S. Afr.),
Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=266159&area=/zuma_report
/zuma_news/.
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responsible for actions which incite violence and publicly degrade the
dignity of any citizen.”85
These assumptions, attitudes and beliefs persist in the courts,
as well as in other societal institutions. The examples previously given
relate to the treatment of women judges by male members of the
Bench. But these assumptions, attitudes and beliefs are evident in
judicial decisions as well. A candidate for appointment to the High
Court, while serving as Active Judge, asserted with pride that he had
exercised judicial discretion in not imposing the minimum sentence
prescribed by law on a repeat offender who had raped three girls: ages
seven, eight and nine. The candidate, in justifying his decision not to
impose the minimum sentence, stated that he had no evidence before
him that the children had suffered any physical injury, that the rapist
was a frail seventy-one year old grandfather and that the rapist had not
used a gun.86
Another judge, participating in a discussion on how to advance
the appointment of women, revealed a more subtle vestige of sexist
attitudes. He started by asserting his “sympathy” for what he called the
“fast tracking” of women judges. The judge qualified his expression of
“support,” however, with the following statement:
What I would urge is that the exercise be implemented
with sensitivity and care. An attractive destination on a
cheap ticket is something we would all like. That is a
fine thing in the world of travel. Nobody wants that
route to a prized professional position.87
An assumption that women are not as qualified as men lies buried,
though not far from the surface, in this call for “sensitivity and care.”
These assumptions, attitudes and beliefs may well even be
present in the JSC, the agency charged with advancing the
transformation of the judiciary by race and gender. This is more than
suggested by an exchange during one of its October 2005 interviews.
After one JSC member had asked a woman judicial candidate what
would be necessary to keep her in the country if she did not get the

85. Id.
86. Interview of Mr. Dumisani Hamilton Zondi by the JSC, in South Africa (Oct. 19,
2005) (transcript on file with the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion,
Gender and Class).
87. Howie, supra note 59, at 16.
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appointment, another JSC member responded, “[w]hat about a
boyfriend?”88
B. Gender Equality Subordinate to Racial Equality
Another reason for the underrepresentation of women is that
gender equality continues to be subordinate to racial equality as a
concern among those engaged in the transformation of the judiciary.
Although feminists won significant gains with respect to the
Constitution’s treatment of gender equality, their achievements on
paper were not subsequently matched by deeds in the New
Democracy. In the New Democracy, the focus has been and continues
to be on race, often at the expense of gender considerations.
Before the New Democracy, during the decades of struggle
against apartheid, women’s equality demands were subordinated to the
goal of political liberation. This was reflected in the Freedom Charter,
written in 1955 by the national liberation organizations, and again,
thirty-three years later, in the Constitutional Guidelines prepared by
the ANC.89
The women in the national liberation struggle wanted to
prevent the classic post-struggle invisibility of women that had
occurred in other African countries.90 Following the presentation of the
Constitutional Guidelines, women in the ANC, as previously
indicated, held a number of meetings, concluding with a conference in
Amsterdam that proclaimed that gender equality should be an
autonomous aspect of national liberation.91
Five months after Amsterdam, the ANC National Executive
Committee issued a policy statement that responded to the position
urged by the women at Amsterdam. It acknowledged, as Albertyn
explained, that:
the emancipation of women had to be addressed “in its
own right.” This statement represented a substantial
shift in the ANC position on women. It was the first
official acceptance of the independent nature of
88. Interview of Professor P. Andrews by the JSC, in South Africa (Oct. 18, 2005)
(transcript on file with the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and
Class).
89. Albertyn, supra note 16, at 45–46.
90. Id. at 49, n.46.
91. Id. at 47–48.
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women’s liberation. It was also significant in its
acknowledgment of the material, cultural and
ideological context of gender oppression and facilitated
a far more sophisticated policy and strategy on gender
in the mass democratic movement than previously. 92

Despite the seeming acceptance that women’s rights should be
incorporated into the Constitution, and the demonstration of politically
important numbers behind the call for gender equality, few women
were included among the delegates who were to negotiate the new
constitution. In the 1992 negotiations, only twenty-three of the 400
delegates were women and in the next round of negotiations women
were also few in number.93
In addition to the disadvantage of numbers, the women
delegates, constituting a women’s lobby, had to confront strong
opposition from the traditional and religious leaders. During the debate
on the Bill of Rights in August 1993, for instance, Chief Nonkonyana
― a member of one of the traditional leaders’ delegations ― objected
to the equality provisions, stating that, as a traditional leader, he did
not support equality for women.94
On the other hand, “South African feminists . . . made it clear,”
as Felicity Kaganas and Christina Murray observed, “that they [were]
not prepared to offer up women’s rights to the cause of protecting an
institution distorted by colonialism, apartheid, and the opportunism of
powerful men.”95 The attempt by traditional leaders to erect a wall
between customary law and the Bill of Rights was, as Albertyn
reported, “one of the most bitterly fought battles in the [negotiation]
process.”96
Although the members of the Women’s Lobby achieved only
partial success regarding their objectives in the negotiations — as
Albertyn observed, their achievements were “tempered by several
levels of marginalization and exclusion . . . .”97 ― it was undeniable
that “women . . . made significant gains in the struggle for gender

92.
93.
94.
1993).
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 54–55.
Id. at 57 (citing Equality for Women? No Thanks, SUNDAY TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 8,
Kaganas & Murray, supra note 73, at 19–20.
Albertyn, supra note 16, at 40.
Id. at 56.
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equality.”98 As noted by Nhlapo, the Women’s Lobby prevented “an
outright victory of the traditionalists”99 by achieving a compromise
that gave constitutional recognition to customary and religious law, but
restricted these laws from violating the rights extended to women.100
Such achievements during the negotiations were sufficient to place the
South Africa Constitution, in its treatment of gender equality, way
ahead of the constitutions of other countries.
The autonomous status that the feminists sought for their
emancipation and that they achieved in words, however, was not
matched by deeds. Although “race” and “gender” became linked, as if
one word, the subsequent focus has been and continues to be on race.
Not infrequently, this is to the exclusion of gender considerations.
Various reports that purport to deal with the subject of the
transformation of the judiciary either defer consideration of gender
until late in the document or omit any reference to gender
altogether.101 When this observation was made to a male advocate for
more women judges ― an advocate important in the judicial
appointment process ― he implicitly acknowledged this assessment
when he asserted that this was understandable given South Africa’s
apartheid and colonial past.102 “Gender” is thus tagging along behind
“race.” As the Legal Editor of the Sunday Times stated it:
[t]here’s tremendous pressure on the JSC from
politicians, from the President and Minister of Justice
down, to speed up the number of black judges
appointed. . . . [T]hough I have to say that while
politicians are concerned about colour, there’s very
little expression of concern about gender and there still
are hopelessly few women on the Bench.103

98.
99.

Id. at 60.
Thandabantu Nhlapo, African Customary Law in the Interim Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE 157, 157 (Sandra Liebenberg
ed., 1995).
100. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, §§ 7 (2), 31 (a), (b).
101. Wyndham Hartley, Judge Seeks ‘Revolutionary Change’, BUSINESS DAY (S. Afr.),
Apr. 5, 2005, available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=
1414659.
102. Conversation with Chief Justice Pius Langa, supra note 58.
103. Rickard, supra note 51, at 6.
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C. Underrepresentation of Women at the Bar

A third reason for the underrepresentation of women in the
superior courts is that they are even more woefully underrepresented in
the legal pool from which candidates are selected.
The legal practitioners in South Africa divide into advocates
and attorneys. The advocates, like barristers in the United Kingdom,
are the court specialists. Their clients are the attorneys who brief them.
The attorneys, like the solicitors in the United Kingdom, are the
lawyers who work directly with the plaintiffs or defendants. Advocates
and attorneys differ typically in their legal education and certainly in
their experience as lawyers. They go through different qualifying
processes and belong to different professional organizations. The
advocates’ organizations are the General Council of the Bar and its
constituent Bars; the attorneys’ organizations are the Law Societies.
Since 1994, attorneys have been permitted to argue in the superior
courts, but this has made little difference in the predominance of
advocates there.
The Bar and the Bench have been, and continue to be, closely
linked. Appointments to the High Court were, in the pre-democracy
years, almost exclusively selected from the senior ranks of the Bar.
Although the Minister of Justice under the New Democracy enlarged
the pool to include attorneys and magistrates, the advocates still
dominate appointments because of the preference for their education
and courtroom experience and from the bias of habit in the selection
process.
Women represent a small minority of advocates. This is
striking given that women represent a majority of students in many of
the law schools and are often reported to be among the brightest
students. Yet, they are not at the Bar in numbers that reflect their
engagement in law schools. In April 2004, eighty-four percent of the
1871 advocates were males.104 Similarly, 311 of the 324 (ninety-six
percent) of the senior advocates who constitute the prime pool for
judicial appointments were males.105
The numbers improve for women if one were to reduce the
years of experience, but not to an impressive level. Only twenty-six

104. Debating the Transformation of the Judiciary: Rhetoric and Substance, supra note
36, at 4.
105. Id.
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percent of the 513 advocates with less than five years of experience
were women. As one member of the Bar stated:
[A]t all levels of the profession the female population
of the Bar is disproportionately small, commencing at
the stage of . . . intakes. . . . The proportion of [the
Cape] Bar [one of the constituent Bars] that [is made up
of] women is increasing only at an unacceptably slow
rate. Over the past two years it has increased less than
1% where the Bar has increased in size by 10%. Over
ten years, the proportion of female members . . . has
increased by only 4.8% [while the] Bar has increased
by over 50%.106
D. Women’s Invisibility
A fourth reason offered here to account for the absence of
women from the Bench is their invisibility. Anna-Marie de Vos, a lone
woman serving on a court with fifty-four men, referred to her low
profile when interviewed by the JSC in October 2005 for the position
of Deputy Judge President.107 Another woman judge, as noted
previously, spoke of her invisibility.108 This is partly a result of the
small number of women, who easily get lost in the crowd of men, and
partly because more visible posts, such as Judge Presidents, Deputy
Judge Presidents, and heads of professional association committees,
are held by men. Many women judges stress in conversations the need
for greater visibility so that women in judicial robes can become part
of the cultural consciousness and become perceptually normalized.
E. Lackluster Effort of Judicial Gatekeepers
The JSC and the Judge Presidents are important gatekeepers
positioned at the doors to the courts. The JSC, although designated to
advance the mission of a more representative judiciary, may be
blocking appointments of women rather than advancing them.
106. Susannah Cowen, Breaking through Glass Ceilings, ADVOCATE, Dec. 2005, at 47.
107. Interview of Judge Anna-Marie de Vos by the JSC, in South Africa (Oct. 19, 2005)
(transcript on file with the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and
Class).
108. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Except for the President’s appointees, the Constitution
identifies the positions of the members and the processes for their
selection. The Constitution, however, requires no affirmative action, as
is clear from the membership. In 2004, only four (17.4 percent) of the
twenty-three members were women.109 At some JSC meetings, there
can be as many as thirty participants since the Constitution provides
that the Judge President of a High Court and the Premier of the
province within which the court is located may also serve when
candidates are being interviewed for a judicial vacancy on that
court.110 When the few women members are interspersed among thirty
interviewers, their presence is diminished.
Reference was previously made to the exchange between JSC
members when considering a candidate who was living outside of
South Africa.111 Carmel Rickard commented on this in the Sunday
Times. She advised that the:
[n]ext time the Judicial Service Commission indulges in
its periodic soul-searching over the lack of women on
the Bench, in the legal profession or on its short list of
candidates to interview, members should reflect on that
exchange. For one thing, it illustrates that judges are not
the only people who should undergo sensitivity training
― those choosing them could also do with some
help.112
She further compares the treatment of women being
interviewed by commission members with the treatment of male
interviewees, noting that it provided:
repeated evidence of just how much gender-related
prejudice still flourishes. And the answers to many of
the questions about what prevents women advancing in
the profession were played out in public. . . .[T]heir
indifferent response to the realities raised by [one of the
women candidates] illustrates why the perception
109. 2004 JSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 7.
110. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 178 (1) (a - k).

111. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
112. Carmel Rickard, Judging Women Harshly, SUNDAY TIMES (S. Afr.), Oct. 23, 2005,
available at http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=1735237.
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continues that the Bench and the profession remain
hostile to women.113
The Judge Presidents, all of whom are male, have not
demonstrated their commitment to women’s advancement to the
Bench. They are key to the appointment of women as Acting Judges
and as Acting Judge Deputy Presidents ― both of which are
significant appointments in evaluations for appointments as Judge or
as Deputy Judge President. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development made an implicit, though indirect, acknowledgment that
the Judge Presidents have been less than aggressive in fulfilling their
obligation to transform the judiciary regarding gender. She reported at
the launching meeting of the South Africa Chapter of the International
Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) that the Judge Presidents “have
indicated to me that they are committed to the transformation of the
judiciary and to enabling the progression of women to the Bench.
There will be more acting positions for women aspiring to become
judges.”114

VII. INTERVENTIONS FOR CHANGE
What is being done to get more women ― of course, qualified
women ― onto the Bench? There are proposals for long-range efforts
similar to those enumerated in the 10 Point Millennium Plan.115
Although these are important, there are also interventions that can
increase the number of women judges and women judicial leaders
now.
Even though the numbers of women judges and advocates are
small, there are twenty-four women judges from whom Judge
Presidents and Deputy Judge Presidents could be selected, and there
are 122 women ― advocates as well as additional women attorneys
and magistrates ― who are qualified for appointment as judges. The
pool, small though it is, is large enough to provide the small number of
women appointees that could double the number of women judges,
making a dramatic increase of 100 percent.

113. Id.
114. Mabandla, supra note 61.
115. See supra note 44.
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One intervention that the newly established South Africa
chapter of IAWJ was considering was the preparation of a directory
that would include the women “in the pool.”116 The directory would
identify the women and describe their qualifications. The Heads of
Court, leaders of the General Counsel of the Bar, the Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development and others in positions to help
advance women’s legal careers, but who claim they cannot find any
women, could turn to the directory. The directory could also be used
by journalists to provide the greater visibility so needed for the women
already in the pool.
An effort to accelerate the learning process for aspirant judges
through a training program for women only has been promised by the
Chief Justice. An effort is also underway to increase the number of
women advocates. Susannah Cowen, an advocate, is taking on the
challenge of increasing the numbers for women. She is mobilizing
women advocates with the goal of identifying:
a large pool of successful, largely African, senior
female advocates from which the JSC can pick the best
and most suitable when selecting South Africa’s judges.
. . . While the Bar is no doubt not the only good place
from which to secure judges, it is a superb training
ground.117
Cowen has also identified the difficulties that discourage and preclude
women from remaining at the Bar, some of which are easily eliminated
where there is the will and support to do so.118
Are there other avenues to change? The Chairman of the
General Council of the Bar, the national professional organization of
advocates, has asserted over his years as a leader of the Bar, the
necessity for changing the composition of the Bar so that it retains its
favored position as the recruitment source for the judiciary —
something he and, one can presume, most advocates desire. If the Bar
does not change voluntarily, then he foresees a threatening reality of
parliamentary intervention.119 Perhaps ultimately the will to assist and
116 As of the date of this article, the IAWJ has not been able to proceed with this
initiative.
117. Cowen, supra note 106, at 47.
118 Id. at 47-49.
119. Arendse & Ngalwaria, supra note 33, at 75.
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enable women to stay in the Bar will materialize in combination with
the threat of parliamentary action and the mobilization of women
advocates.

VII. CONCLUSION:
THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN IN COURTS
In South Africa, the appointment of women judges has a
symbolic importance that it does not have in other countries. Those
who were in “the struggle” and who contributed to the vision of a
society based on non-racialism and non-sexism, made a gender
balanced judiciary part of the social contract. Success in moving
toward a judiciary that broadly reflects the gender composition of
South Africa symbolizes that the government has the will and
capability to keep that part of the social contract. By extension, it also
symbolizes that it has the will and capability to move toward keeping
the other social contract promises. Conversely, insufficient
advancement toward a gender balanced judiciary weakens confidence
in the will and capability to consolidate democracy. The presence of
women on the bench in South Africa tells a story of promises kept or
promises broken. “Failure to move forward towards gender equality,”
the President of the Republic of South Africa stated plainly in 2002,
“can only mean that we are not advancing significantly toward the
creation of a new South Africa.”120
The account of South Africa’s progress regarding the
transformation of the judiciary by gender is important to activists in
other countries where the ideal of a human rights-based society is
alive. For people in those countries, the Republic of South Africa is an
exemplar. How South Africa moves toward its ideals has the power to
encourage or discourage what happens elsewhere in the world.

120. Thabo Mbeki, Gender Equality the Litmus Test for Social Change, ANC TODAY (S.
Afr.), Aug. 8, 2002, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at32.htm.
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